This article identifies and proposes a framework to explain the responses of Latin America's Roman Catholic churches to a new strategic dilemma posed by religious and political pluralism. Because the church's goals of defending institutional interests, evangelizing, promoting public morality, and grounding public policy in Catholic social teaching cut across existing political cleavages, Church leaders must make strategic choices about which to emphasize in their messages to the faithful, investment of pastoral resources, and alliances. I develop a typology of Episcopal responses based on the cases of Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, and explain strategic choices by the church's capacity to mobilize civil society, its degree of religious hegemony, and the ideological orientations of Catholics. The analysis draws from 620 Episcopal documents issued since 2000.
Fifty years ago, the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America enjoyed extraordinary influence in politics and a near monopoly on religious belief and practice: in many countries presidents and generals had to be Catholic, more than nine of every ten Latin Americans called themselves Catholic, and children received Catholic religious education in private or state schools. Today, intensifying religious competition and an advancing tide of secularism have eroded the political influence and religious and cultural hegemony of the Catholic Church, with potentially profound consequences for politics and public policy in pluralist democracies.
How has the Catholic Church responded to religious and political pluralism?
After a period in which many of Latin America's Catholic churches stood with progressive sectors of their own societies against bloody dictators, several, falling back into step with a more conservative Vatican leadership, are imposing greater control over the grassroots, defending their corporate interests, and enlisting secular state authorities to enforce the social and family policy outcomes that they cannot induce through moral persuasion; in these cases the old battle lines of the secular versus the religious, liberal rights versus moral protections, and rights of women versus the defense of the family appear to be re-forming. Yet, other Catholic churches have maintained progressive positions, invited more popular participation, devoted more pastoral care to the poor and excluded, and championed the Church's social doctrine, for reasons that are not clear.
The principal frameworks that for decades have guided our understanding of the shifting involvements and influence of the Roman Catholic Church on politics and society in Latin America-the institutionalist, ideational, and religious economy paradigms-did not anticipate and are now hard pressed to explain diverging responses to the challenges of religious and political pluralism in a post-Vatican II world. 1 This paper refocuses scholarly attention on the contemporary Roman Catholic Church in Latin America. Its aims are to define and identify national responses to the new strategic dilemma facing the Church, propose a framework for understanding those responses, and flag the consequences of the Church's decisions for electoral politics, public policy, and the Church itself. Like the religious economy paradigm, I treat the Church as a strategic actor, but I define the Church's strategic goals more broadly. In addition to acting to defend its institutional interests, the Catholic Church also seeks to evangelize, promote public morality, and ground public policy in Catholic social teaching. The dilemma for the Church lies in the fact that its positions on ethical and social justice issues sometimes cut across political cleavages, often forcing Church leaders to emphasize one agenda or the other.
To explain why religious hierarchies make the choices they do, I propose a framework that privileges their relationships with the civil societies within which they are embedded. I contend that where Catholic churches have lost the capacity to mobilize the faithful-where the institutional reach of the Church and the vitality of its subcultural organizations (and associational life in general) are weak-and where religious competition and/or secularization has eroded the Church's position of religious dominance, Church leaders are likely to seek strategic allies on the political right who can protect its institutional interests and promote a public policy agenda consistent with the central tenets of Church teachings. On the other hand, where religious pluralism is high and the Church must be attentive to the possibility of defection, but where Catholic religious and lay activists lead a dense network of civic and political associations that are reasonably autonomous from the control of religious authorities, the Catholic base has more potential leverage over its alliances and priorities. Finally, where the Church maintains a near religious monopoly and its networks traverse a robust associational life, the Church is better able to mobilize Catholic civil society for its ambitious programmatic agenda that aligns with politically progressive parties on the impact of market reform and with social conservatives on the right on moral issues. To illustrate these choices I focus on four exemplary cases: the Argentine and Chilean Churches, which diverged sharply in their responses to military governments and have now converged on a strategic option to emphasize public morality more vigorously than the Church's social justice message; the Brazilian Church, which has devoted considerably more attention to mobilizing the poor to use democracy to achieve social justice; and the Mexican Church, which has straddled both dimensions of Catholic doctrine.
The Church's strategic dilemma is not, of course, unique to Latin America.
Building on the Latin American cases, the analysis aspires to illuminate the place of religious institutions in plural and secularizing societies more broadly. I first describe the pluralist challenges facing the Church, introduce the four modal cases, and examine contending perspectives on the Church's responses to its strategic dilemma. In the sections that follow, I advance a framework to explain Church responses to religious and political pluralism based on the Church's capacity to mobilize its supporters to protect its corporate interests and influence the public policy agenda, and then sketch out those responses, drawing from over 620 pastoral letters, messages, declarations, and reports issued or publicized by bishops in these countries since 2000.
RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL PLURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: CHALLENGES, CASES, PERSPECTIVES
The pluralist challenges to Catholics in Latin America today are unprecedented.
Although the number of seminarians and priestly ordinations have risen sharply in the past quarter century, the Church is losing its gravitational pull over the faithful. just under half cite religious faith as a quality that is important to encourage children to learn at home. 4 The Church has also lost its dominance over social networks. However, it is less persuasive in accounting for why certain ideas can prevail and guide Church responses to religious and political pluralism in some contexts but not others. The notion that the progressive Church was more vulnerable and its liberationist wing more easily reined in where its conceptions of faith and mission were not shared by bishops (as was the case in Nicaragua) as they were in Brazil may explain national differences in the short term, but if ideas alone determine the orientation of national episcopates, then the appointment of scores of like-minded bishops in the past quarter century by two more conservative pontiffs and papal nuncios should have by now produced convergent responses to the challenge of pluralism.
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The third-and perhaps most influential-perspective of recent years employs an economic paradigm of competition to explain the strategic responses of national churches. Like the institutionalist paradigm, it sees the Church's corporate interests as paramount, but identifies those practically exclusively in terms of institutional maintenance: the overarching goal is to maximize its membership at the lowest cost.
According to the religious economy thesis, once the religious market was deregulated and the state-imposed and protected religious monopoly of the Catholic Church ended, unsurprisingly the Church lost millions of nominal adherents to Pentecostal competitors who supplied a religious product better suited to consumer demand. 16 Perennially short of priests to administer parishes that were too few, large, and far between, the Catholic Church could not meet its competition in poor neighborhoods and rural areas. In a seminal work, Anthony Gill contended that under dictatorships where the Church was threatened by such competition, its leaders took progressive theological and political stances in defiance of authoritarian regimes and chose to emphasize economic and social justice for the rural and urban poor who historically had received only weak pastoral care. 17 Where there was little fear of losing parishioners to other denominations, on the other hand, Church leaders slipped into easy, historic alliances with wealthy, conservative elites that could support the Church and its organization financially, and did not criticize state authorities that protected the Church's corporate interests in exchange for its silence on human rights abuses. Thus the Church opposed the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, but it acquiesced to an even more brutal one in Argentina.
In a democratic polity, Gill contends, Church incentives are inverted. Still unable to meet competition and now lacking resources once proffered by international donors to fight authoritarian regimes, state protection and support become all the more valuable, the costs of criticizing government rise, and Church leaders seek accommodation with elites. 18 The logic of religious competition and resource scarcity should thus produce a uniform pattern of retrenchment from popular causes, yet such an assumption is problematic empirically: some relatively weak Catholic churches facing low levels of competition, such those in Argentina, have confronted governments, while others facing severe competition, such as those in Brazil, have retained progressive postures.
Moreover, theoretically, there is no intrinsic reason why the resource constraint under democracy should be hard and inelastic; in democratic regimes, other, nonfinancial resources may be effective substitutes for international aid, especially if the Church's goals are broader than merely maintaining buildings and membership rolls.
FRAMING THE CHURCH'S STRATEGIC OPTIONS IN PLURAL DEMOCRACIES
I begin from the premise that these frameworks have failed to predict divergent This ambitious project to influence public space and law, which rejected his predecessor's surrender to the inevitability of secularization and relegating religion to the private sphere, necessarily requires that the Church adopt positions on questions of public morality and social justice and mobilize the faithful for political action. Thus, a second, crucial goal is to maintain morality in the public sphere, protect human rights, and influence public policy on the family and issues of life and death; a third is to advance the Church's social doctrine-to reduce material poverty and achieve social justice and peace. Indeed, the pontificate of John Paul II championed the causes of just compensation for labor, land for the tiller, and universal access to health and education as vigorously as it defended Church teachings on personal morality and the traditional family.
The dilemma for the Church arises from the fact that in democratic regimes, these goals cannot easily be pursued simultaneously. To influence public policy, the Church needs allies in government. Yet, the Church's positions on state protection for the poor and for life and public morality do not map easily onto existing political space and do not comfortably match most partisan options (Figure 1 ). On a traditional left-right continuum on state intervention in the economy, the Church leans strongly toward an equitable distribution of income and land and government provision of social welfare-often contesting neoliberal economic reforms and property rights for generating higher rates of unemployment, depressing wages, dismantling safety nets, and exacerbating inequality. In these circumstances, the Church must choose not what its position will be on the major issues of the day, on which all episcopates essentially agree, but which aspects of Catholic moral and social doctrine it will emphasize in messages to the faithful, pastoral letters, and pastoral commissions. It may propose to advance principles of social justice by renewing religious commitments, or by launching public campaigns to extend rights. It may ally with government elites, oppose them, or maintain a low profile and adhere to political neutrality. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to explaining when national Catholic churches will defend corporate interests, advocate for a moral public sphere, or promote peace and denounce social and economic injustice, and the nature of the alliances they will strike to advance their public policy agendas. I assume a status-quo bias in favor of protecting corporate interests, and following papal direction. But a strong, mobilized base may potentially move Church leaders to prioritize social justice, just as a weak and disorganized one might tempt Church leaders to deemphasize social justice in order to promote its less popular moral agenda or protect its own interests. Specifically, I
contend that the strategic calculations of national Church leaders are initially shaped by their capacity to mobilize civil society, a valuable and underappreciated resource that in a democracy can compensate for the loss of rich benefactors and friends in high places.
How forcefully the Church intervenes, in what arenas, and whether it addresses its messages to voters or politicians will be further influenced by the degree of religious hegemony it enjoys, the ideological orientations of the Catholic grassroots, and the nature and degree of political risk the Church faces. The ideological orientations of mass publics matter to religious hierarchies because in a democracy, Church leaders contemplating intervention in the public debate on particular issues must take into consideration how much support they have or opposition they will face from Catholics and non-Catholics alike.
Mobilizing Society
The Church's ability to mobilize its rank and file for political action depends on the density of voluntary associations and the degree to which membership in secular civic and religious associations overlaps. The intuition is that if lay and religious Catholic activists are present in human rights, women's, and youth groups, as well as in political parties and community associations, they will infuse these organizations with Catholic principles and spread Church influence beyond the orbit of regular churchgoers. Indeed, comparative research confirms that members of churches are generally far more likely to belong to other civic and especially political associations than people who are not, and that religiosity has a "powerfully positive effect" on formal associational memberships. Table 1 ). Where, on the other hand, Catholic churches provided sanctuary to inchoate civic, human rights, and religious associations, they gained an advantage but not a guarantee that once the veil of repression was lifted, religious leadership of civil society organizations would continue. In Chile, activists who were not really tied to the Church vacated the religious orbit when political space was opened for secular associations, and civil society became estranged from the Church that had sheltered it. Today a mere nine percent of Chilean Catholics donate one percent of their salaries to the Church, and in a sweeping study of social movements in the late 1990s, not h Percentage of self-identified Catholics who responded "Our society must be radically changed by revolutionary action" to the question "On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion." (Other options included "Our society must be gradually improved by reform," and "Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.") one mention was made of any Church linkages to labor unions, professional guilds, student organizations, and environmental movements. There is strong reason to believe that membership in civil society associations grew in the 1990s.
In 2002, membership in trade unions and professional associations was reported at 19 and 13 percent, respectively (up from 6 and 5 percent in 1990).
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There is also evidence of a high degree of cross-fertilization of religious and civic associations. Thirty-eight percent of members of unions, parties, and professional associations also worked for religious charitable organizations, and a "significant part of the leadership" of the Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST) is reported to have originated in the youth pastorals of the Catholic Church." 24 In Mexico, where the Church worked with human rights groups through the 1980s and 1990s to oppose corruption, push for fair elections and institutions to guarantee them, and advance democratization, a space for religious activism in politics and society has been preserved, as in Brazil. In 2000, 49 percent of survey respondents reported belonging to at least one organization; especially vibrant were local community action groups, human rights, women's, environmental, and peace movement associations.
The rate of overlapping membership in class associations and parties (39 percent) was also higher than in Argentina and Chile. Catholic Church members in Mexico also dominated local community action groups and human rights groups (comprising two-thirds of total membership), as well as women's groups, the peace movement, and health care organizations (with nearly 60 percent of the membership).
Thus in Argentina and Chile, political, class, and civic associations are not penetrated by Catholic activists, and the Church's capacity to mobilize Catholic civil society is weak to moderate. In Mexico and Brazil, civil society is more densely organized and, more importantly, organized by religious workers, and the Church is better able potentially to mobilize civil society-but for what?
Religious Hegemony and Political Orientation
In democratic times when Catholic politicians are more responsive to constituents than to bishops, the Church's strategic options are influenced not merely by strength in the ranks but also by the degree of religious hegemony they enjoy and the political and Values Survey were strongly opposed to abortion and moderately so to homosexuality and euthanasia, but they are less persuaded about the moral perils of sex education, divorce, and contraception. 25 In Argentina, over four-fifths of respondents in one poll thought it was important to teach sex education in the schools-and most did not think the Church should speak up on the issue.
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In Chile, the legalization of divorce was supported by three-fourths of the population and nearly half of Catholics. Catholic grassroots opinion leans leftward and wants to move in a more progressive direction, it can pull the Church along with it toward a "moderate pluralism." Church leaders are reluctant to identify too closely with conservative elites, causes, and parties to achieve their moral and institutional goals, and instead support minimum wage hikes, peasant land struggles, and the cultural, economic, and political rights of indigenous peoples. On the other hand, in Mexico, where religious hegemony is high and the ideological orientations of the Catholic grassroots are more conservative and conform more closely to those of ecclesiastical authorities, the Church has a greater opportunity to provide "evangelizing leadership" in society. The intuition here is that vibrant churches with close bonds with civil society, sufficient resources, minimal constraints from the laity, and little to fear from religious competitors and secularism can afford to reject political alliances with conservative elites in which they play the role of junior partner.
They may press their own agendas and straddle the difficult political space on ethical doctrines and social teaching.
Each of these strategies carries consequences for the Church's relationship with its followers and its influence over public policy. If the Church allies with elites to defend its institutional interests and promote its moral agenda, this will accelerate the trend toward religious defection, shrink the Church's base in society, and ultimately erode further its potential influence, especially if conservative parties can mobilize voters without Church help and thus avoid alienating secular and Protestant voters by allying too closely with religious leaders. Conversely, where the Church maintains strong links with well-organized grassroots groups, faces little competition, and has a base that is more closely aligned with the full array of Church doctrine's bargaining positions, it will enjoy maximum advantage to influence public policy and speak out accordingly. Where the Church's political alliances are more varied and it is embedded in a plural civil society, the Church, and democracy, will reflect that pluralism. Next, I apply the framework to the four cases.
BISHOPS RESPOND: PATTERNS AND EVIDENCE
All Catholic bishops, without exception, forcefully uphold Church teaching on human life from conception to natural death. Each bishops' conference stridently opposes embryonic stem cell research and any form of human cloning, the availability of the morning-after-pill, any form of assisted suicide, and abortion under any and all circumstances. All heeded the Vatican's call to form pastoral commissions for migrants, support indigenous rights and land struggles, condemn poverty and inequality, and denounce the neoliberal economic model. All claim to be strictly nonpartisan, embrace democracy, and affirm the importance of informed electoral participation and honest politicians who govern transparently. All agree that state-supported religious education is necessary to guarantee genuine pluralism and the fundamental rights of parents to direct their children's education under the principle of subsidiarity. Nonetheless, each establishes its own priorities in choosing the subjects of pastoral letters, allocating scarce resources to social pastoral commissions, and guiding the faithful in their daily lives and at election time. Some, moreover, are more willing than others to clash with governments.
To classify the orientation of these four national churches according to the emphasis they placed on institutional interests, moral issues, and Catholic social doctrine in the past five years, I analyzed a total of over 620 official and unofficial documents, studies, messages, homilies, and interviews of bishops publicized on the websites of their episcopal conferences from 2000-05. I separated traditional religious messages and routine personnel appointments from those directed explicitly to the defense of corporate interests, and pronouncements on social and economic justice from those extolling the virtues of democratic participation and world peace (see Appendix). Because the universe of these documents is not entirely comparable-some conferences post homilies and messages on religious themes by individual bishops, whereas others give more weight to official documents and studies and reflections on salient public issues-and Catholic bishops do not always set their own agenda but tend to react to public policy issues of the day, we cannot necessarily draw meaningful inferences from the simple proportion of documents addressed to one theme or the other. Thus I pay special attention to the contents of official documents (e.g., pastoral letters and conference declarations), and whether messages issued by individual bishops conform to, or dissent from, the rest of the episcopate.
Pro-Active and Defensive Moralism: Argentina and Chile
The 
CONCLUSIONS: FROM MOBILIZATION TO INFLUENCE IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
Finding itself in danger of losing not only the flock, but also a distinctively Catholic social and political sphere, the Latin American Catholic Church has been challenged to mount a defense against religious and political pluralism. This article has argued that in democracies in which the Church's public policy agendas compete in political space, the solution to their national strategic dilemmas of which issues to emphasize and how to do so follow from their ability to mobilize their bases in civil society, religious hegemony, and the orientation of voters. In Argentina and Chile, the inability of national churches to mobilize a diminishing Catholic civil society has led their episcopates to prioritize moral issues. But in Brazil, the hierarchy maintains pastoral commissions to defend the economic and social rights of the poor, and it has denounced public sector corruption as vocally as it has legal abortion and embryonic stem cell research. In Mexico, where Catholic opinion also endorses the Church's moral positions to a greater degree, the hierarchy have more aggressively reminded Catholic voters and politicians of their duties to protect life above all else.
My argument has important implications for electoral politics, public policy, and the Church itself. Future electoral cleavages will depend on whether politics is defined by two separate axes of social justice and moral issues or if these collapse into one issue dimension; Church actions could tip the balance. Public policy outcomes, too, are likely to be heavily influenced by the capacity of the Church to influence the public debate. To date, the Church has lost several battles over such "soft" moral issues as the availability of the morning-after pill and embryonic stem cell research, but the outcome of the coming battles to liberalize abortion is not so clear. Clearly more research will be needed on the outcomes of not only legislation governing bioethical issues and women's rights, but also the court decisions, health ministry regulations, and enforcement of the law in provincial and municipal governments-in these and other countries.
This argument also has forward implications for both the Church's membership base and its capacity to provide evangelizing leadership. I have claimed that the more vulnerable the Church and the more it finds itself losing the battle for culture and political space, the more likely it will be tempted to ally with politically conservative elites on the right to protect its corporate interests and implement its moral agenda. The strategy of forming alliances with state actors to protect its corporate interests is more expedient than the one of building support from below. Yet, in the long run, such a strategy can be detrimental to the institution and cost it influence in shaping the terms of the public debate. The Church stands a better chance of exercising leadership on an array of issues where it can mobilize a Catholic civil society. If it can rely on its own social networks and voters, it will have more latitude to cross traditional, left-right boundaries and address issues of its choice in the public arena, to champion social justice and public morality, and to formulate a genuinely Catholic response to pluralism.
